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Purbalingga is the first kabupaten in Indonesia to start implementing its health insurance scheme 
for the poor, as a replacement for the JPS-BK scheme (Social Safety Net Program – Health 
Sector). Poor families (Gakin) receive a range of health insurance services that are subsidized by 
the government free-of-charge, while better-off families pay a premium of only 50% or 100%. 
They are categorized as participants in Gakin Levels I, II and III. The aim is to achieve universal 
coverage for all citizens in Kabupaten Purbalingga, those who are poor as well as those who are 
not. 
 
Kabupaten Purbalingga is considered unique in the scope of its health services, because it not only 
includes poor families in its scheme, but also non-poor families. The local government of 
Kabupaten Purbalingga considers the health insurance scheme to be one of the main pillars of the 
poverty reduction effort in the region. They want the management of this scheme to become more 
independent and less dependent on DinKes (the local government health agency) so the program 
can be managed more efficiently and with more accountability. What is rather interesting is that 
DinKes plans to arrange a health insurance scheme that will be autonomous and sustainable for all 
better-off members in the future. They intend to slowly increase the premium until it reaches the 
real cost of the assistance package. According to DinKes, the cost should be approximately 
Rp92,000 per family per month. From the perspective of Bapel, an autonomous scheme with that 
level of premium definitely has potential, however they will always depend on the premiums to be 
paid by the government. 
 
It needs to be noted that the Community Health Insurance Scheme (JPKM) initiative in 
Kabupaten Purbalingga is almost entirely the initiative of the government as its moving force. The 
main protagonists are government (Regent, DinKes and Bapel), public service providers (public 
hospitals and puskesmas), the local parliament (DPRD) and other government agencies. 
 
 
Key words: JPK- Gakin; Purbalingga; health; poverty program.  




A. THE JPK-GAKIN SCHEME IN PURBALINGGA  
 
The JPKM
1 Scheme in Purbalingga is managed by a Management Agency (Bapel), named 
PT Sadar Sehat Mandiri. The Bapel was established by the Bupati Decree No. 40/63 in 
2003, effective April 7, 2003. The scheme has, however, been operational since the 
2001/2002 fiscal year, since the Purbalingga government considered it important to firstly 
establish a scheme and worry about its implementing regulations later. Purbalingga chooses 
to have a separate Bapel managing its JPKM scheme because it wants the scheme’s 
management to be independent of the government health office (Dinas Kesehatan or 
DinKes), so that the program can be managed more efficiently and accountably. 
 
Purbalingga is considered to be unique in its health care coverage, because it not includes 
poor  (gakin)  families in its scheme, but also includes non-gakin families as well. Gakin 
clients receive their insurance coverage free of charge (subsidized by the government), 
while non-poor families pay a premium of either 50% or 100% of the full rate (see below 
for details). The aim of the program is to achieve universal coverage for the entire 
population of the Purbalingga District, both those who are poor (who formerly received the 
JPS-BK
2 subsidies) and those who are non-poor. 
 
The Bapel in Purbalingga provides three benefit packages that are very similar, if people 
want to join they are eligible for a benefit package with a corresponding premium based on 
their income. Participants of the JPKM scheme were divided into three categories based on 
their income: 
•  Strata I: poor families (keluarga miskin-Gakin): free of charge. Usually Gakin/Strata I 
members work as casual laborers or landless farmers.  
•  Strata II: families that used to be poor (keluarga pasca-Gakin): income levels and living 
situation just above miskin: pay 50% of the full premium (currently Rp25,000). These 
are generally the informal workers such as ojek and becak drivers.  
•  Strata III: non-poor/rich families (keluarga non-Gakin): the “wealthy”/those who can 
pay the full amount of the premium (currently Rp50,000). Kaders, (local volunteers) 
only pay 50% of the premium but receive the Strata III benefit package. The kaders play 
a central role in the provisioning and functioning of the scheme in Purbalingga, their 
role will be expanded upon later in this report. In general, Strata III members are mid-
size or large retail merchants. 
 
Health providers in Purbalingga that accept JPKM members as patients are categorized as 
the following: 
•  Provider Class I (PPK I): public health center (puskesmas), and village midwife (bidan 
desa). All JPKM members are expected to seek their health care from the puskesmas 
first. 
•  Provider Class II (PPK II): District Public Hospital (Rumah Sakit Umum Daerah-
RSUD). It receives JPKM patients that were referred by the Puskesmas.  
                                                             
1 JPKM: Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat (Community Health Insurance Scheme). 
2 JPS-BK: Jaringan Pengaman Sosial Bidang Kesehatan (Social Safety Net Program in the Health Sector).  
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•  Provider Class III (PPK III): Provincial Public Hospital (Rumah Sakit Umum Provinsi-
RSUP). (This only applies for Gakin/Strata I clients Strata II and III could not be 
referred outside of Purbalingga). There are two RSUP in the Central Java Province: 
RSUP Karyadi in Semarang and RSUP Margono in Purwokerto, only 30 kilometers 
from the Purbalingga District.  
 
It should be noted that these providers are public/state owned providers only. Private 
providers are unable (or unwilling) to become JPKM providers, due to the perceived 
inadequacy of reimbursements under the scheme.  
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II.  SCHEME: FUNCTIONAL 
 
 
A. POLITICAL ECONOMY: WHO INITIATED? 
 
The health insurance scheme in Purbalingga had its roots in the 1998 economic crisis, as 
part of the Indonesian Government’s Social Safety Net Scheme for the Health Sector 
(JPS-BK). Even though this program was discontinued by the central government in 2000, 
the local government realized that many of its beneficiaries continue to need support to 
access health care services. Therefore, the Purbalingga District Government decided to 
continue an adapted version of the program in 2000, and renamed it as the Health 
Insurance Scheme for Poor Families (JPK-Gakin). The program then was expanded into a 
Community Health Insurance Scheme (JPKM), that is open to all citizens in fiscal year 
2001/2002. Purbalingga was the first district in Indonesia to install its own health insurance 
program for the poor as a replacement for the JPS-BK scheme within its district and the 
stakeholders involved seem to be highly motivated to make this scheme work. According 
to the Head of the Bapel, the initiative to create this health insurance is based on the view 
that during the previous JPS-BK scheme, the subsidies were spent with little accountability 
and little regard for the program’s future sustainability, and with a health insurance scheme 
these problems could be addressed. 
 
The reason for providing three benefit packages for people of different incomes is to 
increase access to health care and utilization of health care services for all people in 
Purbalingga’s society. The Purbalingga government considers the health insurance scheme 
as one of the major pillars of the government’s poverty reduction efforts in the district.
3 
The scheme allows access not only for the poorest of their society, but also provides an 
option for people with other income levels in need of health insurance. These targets have 
been written down in the “Healthy Indonesia 2010” program formulated by the Ministry of 
Health. The idea that was adopted by the Purbalingga government was for it to develop a 
health insurance scheme with the aim of achieving universal coverage for the entire 
population of the Purbalingga District. Therefore, the Purbalingga government decided to 
provide three different packages depending on people’s income, both those who are poor 
(who formerly received the JPS-BK subsidies) and those who are non-poor. 
 
Interestingly enough, the DinKes plans to make the health insurance scheme self-
sustainable for the non-gakin members in the future. They intend to slowly increase the 
premium until it reaches the real price of the benefit package. According to the DinKes 
that price should be around Rp92,000 per family per month. From Bapel’s perspective a self-
sustaining scheme at that premium level is possible, but they will always depend on the 
premium paid for the poor by the government. As the head of the Bapel in Purbalingga puts 
it: “It is the task for the government to provide health care for the poor so they will 
continue to provide funds to do so.” If they had to rely on a cross-subsidy from the Strata 
III insured for both the Strata II and the Strata I insured they will be over-reliant on the 
premium of Strata III insured and the burden on their contribution would be too high. 
 
 
                                                             
3 Other pillars are: food security program, housing reparation program for poor households, provision of 
clothing, education and special credit for small businesses.   
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It should be noted that the JPKM insurance initiative in Purbalingga is almost entirely a 
government-driven initiative, with the main actors being the government (the Bupati, 
DinKes, Bapel), public providers (RSUD and puskesmas), local Parliament (DPRD), and 
other governmental agencies. Other stakeholders (the community, private sector, NGOs, 
etc.) do not have much role in shaping this policy initiative. Their role thus far is only as 
members/clients of the scheme, paying its premiums and receiving its benefits, if they are 
willing to do so. 
 
B. JPKM FINANCING IN PURBALINGGA 
 
The premium for the health insurance scheme is set by the Bapel with feedback from the 
health care providers. When the program was set up in 2001, the premium for Strata II and 
III was set at Rp30,000 per family per year with full payment for the third strata and half 
payment for the second strata. The premium was raised to its current level (Rp25,000 per 
family per year for Strata II and Rp50,000 for Strata III) in 2003. Since the 2004 financial 
year, the insurance premium has been set at Rp50,000/household/year.  
 
Apart from private contributions, the main portion of revenue comes from the subsidies of 
both central as well as local government. In Fiscal Year 2002/2003, over 70% of the 
revenues originated from government subsidies. These subsidies almost tripled in the 
following year as shown in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Financing Sources of JPKM Scheme in Purbalingga 
Funding Source  FY 2002/03 (millions of Rp)  FY 2003/04 (millions of Rp) 
Oil subsidy compensation (PKPS-BBM) 291  2,583 
Local government budget (APBD)  1,270  2,080 
JPKM Premium (Strata II & III)  645  n/a 
 
Theoretically, each strata has different revenue sources: 
•  Strata I: all funding comes from the general block grant (Dana Alokasi Umum-
DAU) and fuel compensation subsidies for poor families (PKPS-BBM
4). 
•  Strata II: half of the funding comes from members’ premiums and the other half is 
from subsidies coming from similar sources as Strata I. 
•  Strata III: all funding comes from members’ own premiums (self-funded). 
 
Both Bapel and the health provider (RSUD) stated that at this time however, the amount 
of funds allocated to subsidize Gakin/Strata I members far exceeded the funds collected 
from Strata II and III members and that the premium is not sufficient to fully cover the cost 
of health services for these members.
5 This allows members and society to get used to the 
principles of (health) insurance and increases their willingness to pay for a health scheme. 
The Bapel head said that this premium is only an “introductory premium.” It is planned 
that this introductory premium will be increased gradually until it reaches the real premium 
rate around the year 2012. By that time, the scheme is supposed to become self-sufficient, 
without the need for government subsidies to cover its financial shortfalls. 
                                                             
4 PKPS BBM: Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (Compensation Program for 
Reduced Subsidies on Refined Fuel Oil). 
5 The real premium cost is estimated to be Rp96,000/household/year.   
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Both first line treatment and specialized care (puskesmas and hospital) are reimbursed 
through a capitation payment. Communication between the different stakeholders 
regarding the payment is regular, but there is more correspondence between hospital and 
Bapel than puskesmas and Bapel. This may be because the ties between the hospital and the 
Bapel are stronger as doctors in the hospital are also employed in the Bapel. 
 
The capitation payment for outpatients receiving highly subsidized puskesmas care is, by 
definition, the smallest subsidy received. The puskesmas receives Rp20,000 per family per 
year.
6 Interestingly enough puskesmas and the hospital almost receive the same capitation 
payment although the reimbursement for in-patient treatment at the puskesmas is higher 
than the hospital.  
 
Table 2: Capitation Payment to RSUD (per Household/KK) 
Services Type  Amount (in Rupiahs)  Note 
RSUD Capitation for in-patients                             21,500    
Outpatient Treatment at puskesmas                             20,000    
In-patient Treatment at puskesmas                             22,000   (Rp20,000 OP + Rp2,000) 
Bapel's Management Fee                               6,000    
Source: Bapel.    
 
Over the past three years the capitation payment for the RSUD has doubled as the 
capitation set in previous years proved to be insufficient (see Table 3 below). After 
consultations between the different stakeholders the capitation rate has been significantly 
increased. The staff of the RSUD find it difficult to predict whether this years’ capitation 
will be enough. They expect this years’ expenditures to be closer to the capitation payment, 
but this will not reduce the deficit they accrued over previous years. 
 
Table3: Capitation Payments to RSUD (2001-2002 to 2004-2005) 
Year 1  2001-2002  Rp11,000/yr 
Year 2  2002-2003  Rp14,000/yr 
Year 3  2003-2004  Rp20,750/yr 
Year 4  2004-2005  Rp21,500/yr 












                                                             
6 One puskesmas visit costs Rp5,500 thus each family could make at least three visits to the doctor.  
SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  6
C. BENEFIT PACKAGE 
 
In principle, insurance members receive their primary health care first. They are entitled to 
receive all necessary medical services that are available at a puskesmas. It should be noted 
however, that the types of service and medication actually available at puskesmas are 
relatively limited,
7 although both puskesmas and DinKes staff (and also several 
patients/clients interviewed, especially those who are also kaders) stated that, since the 
JPKM commenced operations, the quality of services of puskesmas have increased. As a 
result, many JPKM members require referral to the RSUD. 
 
For Gakin/Strata I members, there are no restrictions on the types of treatment they can 
receive at the RSUD. For Strata II and Strata III members however, there are some 
limitations, including: 
•  in-patient treatments are limited to a maximum of 10 days; 
•  the type of medication being used;
8 
•  laboratory expenditures are limited to a maximum of Rp15,000; and 
•  X-ray expenditures are limited to a maximum of Rp25,000. 
 
If Strata II and III health expenditures exceed these limits, the patient has to pay the entire 
cost above these limits (a co-payment). If insurance members cannot pay the entire 
amount at once, they can pay them by installment. 
 
In addition, officially there is a rule stating that some health services will not be covered 
for insurance members,
9 however, it is unclear whether this rule is actually being enforced 
by health providers. Health providers seem to make exceptions to this rule in the case of 
Gakin/Strata I members. An RSUD staff stated that “all Gakin members will receive all 
necessary treatments required for their health care, regardless of costs.” The rights of JPKM 
members to receive health services in puskesmas and RSUD are specified in Appendix 1. 
 
D. THE ROLE OF KADERS IN MARKETING AND IDENTIFYING JPKM MEMBERS 
 
The identification and verification of the poor is an important and difficult step in 
providing health care for the poor. During the period of the health card (JPS-BK), 
identification of the poor was a major problem. If the poor are not aware of their rights they 
cannot make use of the health insurance and therefore publicizing the program is of crucial 
importance. For the identification and verification of the poor, and the socialization (or 
marketing) of the program, the Purbalingga District makes use of a Tim Desa. This team 




                                                             
7 Examples of health services that are supposed to be available at puskesmas are: 1) outpatient and in-patient 
services for both JPKM and non-JPKM members, 2) prevention of infectious diseases, 3) identification of 
infectious diseases, and 4) malnutrition prevention and treatment.  
8 The use of generic medicine is strongly encouraged. Patented drugs can only be used after receiving an 
approval from a peer review commission established within the RSUD. 
9 See Appendix 1 for details.  
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A large role in the marketing and socialization of JPKM is played by members of the Family 
Welfare Program (PKK) who are commonly called kaders. Typical kaders are the wives of 
the local Household Association (RT) Head or the wives of an important member of the 
community, such as a teacher, a religious leader (ulama) or a civil servant. Kaders operate 
among the grassroots of the community and there is at least one kader in each RT.
10 They 
are involved in the socialization efforts of various other government programs, ranging 
from child immunization (posyandu) to farm planting methods. 
 
Since  kaders live among the community, they know many of the community members 
living near them quite well. Thus, it is easy for them to approach community members and 
publicize a given government program. At the same time, community members are more 
likely to consider information received from kaders more seriously than that communicated 
by government officials, who often do not live in the community and have more distant 
and impersonal relationships with community members compared with kaders.  
 
Kaders are probably the most effective tools used by the district government to market the 
JPKM scheme, given that they know the surrounding community closely and are perceived 
to be a more reliable information source than formal government bureaucracy. As a result, 
the success of JPKM largely depends on the marketing methods of kaders and their skills in 
promoting and marketing it. Even when these efforts were also conducted by Bapel through 
other means,
11 it is through the kader system that most of the marketing and socialization 
efforts to recruit new JPKM members are centered. They are the ones who explain to the 
community what the JPKM scheme is all about and why citizens should join it as well as 
recruit JPKM members in their living/working area. These activities are done both through 
formal community members and informal communications with fellow community 
members when conducting routine daily activities. 
 
Kaders normally do this work on a voluntary basis. They only receive a small amount of 
incentive payment (around Rp1,000 per member signed up) in return for their marketing 
and socialization efforts. Thus, the financial cost of using the kader system in marketing the 
program was minimal. 
 
The recruitment and validation of JPKM members is done once per year, between the 
months of June and July. It is especially targeted to identify those families who have 
increased their wealth and are moving from Strata I to Strata II. Kaders are supposed to 
follow a list of predetermined names of community members given to them by the Bapel 
and puskesmas.
12 However, even when they claimed that they follow this list in identifying 
prospective members, in practice they have great influence and discretion in categorizing 
prospective members living in their community, especially in determining who is Gakin 
(Strata I) and who is post-Gakin (Strata II). 
 
According to kaders who were interviewed, in determining those who move from Gakin to 
post-Gakin status, they normally used the condition of the family’s house as a primary 
criteria (for instance, whether the house had a dirt or marble floor) or enquired about 
                                                             
10 Each RT consists of 20 to 30 households. 
11 For instance, the distribution of leaflets and flyers and radio advertisements. 
12 See Appendix 2 for details.  
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whether members of the household have managed to improve their earnings (e.g. those 
who were unemployed are now working). When kaders made these modifications in the 
prospective members’ list, they were usually not challenged by the Bapel and the puskesmas. 
Thus, the influence of kaders in determining JPKM’s membership status is quite substantial. 
 
At the same time, there is considerable pressure from Bapel to increase the number of 
premium paying members (especially at Strata II level) and reduce the number of non-
paying Gakin/Strata I members in the JPKM membership roll. Thus, kaders are pressured to 
“upgrade” the Gakin members in their community to Strata II status, even when these 
members are still technically a Gakin.
13 Consequently, these former Gakin members are no 
longer eligible to receive health services without paying a premium of Rp25,000/KK/year to 
continue receiving these services. 
 
Even though the kaders can more easily identify the category of wealth a household belongs 
to, they are also subject to complaints. Sometimes family members do not accept their 
assigned “status” and complain. In this case kaders have to convince the families that they 
can no longer be identified as Gakin. As the kader is close they can put social pressure on 
them, which can be a risk in correct identification of the real poor. 
 
Another means by which community members were enticed to join the JPKM scheme was 
by increasing puskesmas’ user fees from Rp2,000/person/visit before the 2003/2004 financial 
year to about Rp5,500/person/visit today. The fee is waived for JPKM members, but is 
charged for non-members. Bapel and puskesmas officials stated that this would serve as an 
incentive for citizens to enroll in the JPKM scheme, since they do not have to pay the 
puskesmas user fee if they are enrolled in it. 
 
Lastly, Purbalingga District’s civil servants and kaders were pressured to enroll in the JPKM 
scheme at Strata III level, in order to, according to a DinKes staff, “assure the success of 
this government program.” The civil servants have to pay the full cost of Strata III 
themselves, while the kaders receive a 50% discount (Rp25,000/KK) if they enroll in the 
scheme. 
 
There are several factors that determine the number of community members participating 
in JPKM: 
1.  Members joining Strata I and II are influenced by the marketing methods and ability of 
local activists to promote the scheme at community level (kaders, midwives, and RT 
head). The marketing methods, skills, and motivation of kaders largely influences 
whether or not people will enroll in the scheme. In RTs where the kaders are highly 
motivated and active, people are more likely to be enrolled in the scheme, whereas this 
is not the case in RTs where the kader play a more subdued role. 
2.  Members joining Strata III are influenced by conventional promotion and marketing 
efforts conducted by Bapels (by putting up flyers, radio and newspaper ads, distributing 
leaflets) and other methods such as using “social pressure” to persuade civil servants and 
kaders to enroll at Strata III level. 
3.  The ability of the community to receive and understand information given to them. 
This may be related to the level of their education. 
                                                             
13 This is confirmed from one of the kaders we interviewed.  
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4.  Community perception of puskesmas services (facilities available, service quality, 
effectiveness of medication/drugs, etc.). 
 
Compared with the JPK-Gakin in other districts/cities (e.g. in Tabanan and East Sumba), 
there seems to be more awareness from members/citizens about the JPKM scheme and their 
rights as members of the scheme (e.g. in general they know that with Gakin card, they 
could obtain free health services at puskesmas/RSUD). This should be attributed to the 
aggressive socialization campaign by kaders at the RT level, the training by the puskesmas 
and knowledge of the kaders about the program itself. 
 
This awareness does not necessarily mean however, that more citizens would become 
members of the scheme. Many are still refusing to join the scheme. In some RTs, up to 50% 
of residents are not JPKM members. Reasons given for not joining the program included: 1) 
they do not have the money to pay the JPKM premium (for Strata II and III members), 2) 
they are skeptical about whether they would actually receive the services promised by 
JPKM (without additional “payments/tips” to doctors/paramedics, 3) they believe that the 
quality of health care services provided by puskesmas/RSUD are inferior to those of private 
providers, even while they are not reimbursed by the JPKM scheme, and 4) they already 
have another health insurance package that is more attractive. 
 
E. UTILIZATION AND REFERRAL 
 
A comparison of utilization rates of health care services between insured and non-insured 
and between the different strata indicates a difference in behavior regarding accessing 
health care services. The average monthly utilization rate of JPKM members in Purbalingga 
during fiscal year 2003/2004 is described in Tabel 4 below. 
 
Table 4: Average Monthly Utilization Rate of JPKM Members in Purbalingga 
District in the 2003/2004 Financial Year 
Type of Services  Number of Visits per month  Utilization Rate (in %) 
Outpatient Service  
(Puskesmas and RSUD Outpatient) 
30,614 7.64 
In-patient Service (RSUD)  97  0.02 
Maternity 278  0.07 
Emergency 538  0.13 
Referral to RSUD  1,909  0.48 
Assumptions: There are 100,188 families signed up for JPKM.  
Each KK consists of four members (father, mother, and two children). 
It is therefore assumed that there are 400,752 citizens enrolled in JPKM 
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For Gakin/Strata I members, the average monthly utilization statistics are as follows: 
 
Table 5: Average Monthly Utilization Rate of Gakin/Strata I Members in 
Purbalingga District in the 2003/2004 Financial Year 
Type of Services  Number of Visits per month  Utilization Rate (in %) 
Outpatient Service  
(Puskesmas and RSUD Outpatient) 
6,404   3.19 
In-patient Service (RSUD)  12  0.01 
Maternity 60  0.03 
Emergency 98  0.05 
Referral to RSUD  278   0.14 
Assumptions: There are 50,217 poor families signed up for JPKM. 
Each families consists of four members (father, mother, and two children). 
It is therefore assumed that there are 200,868 citizens enrolled in JPKM 
Source: JPKM Bapel in Purbalingga 
 
While Strata I members contribute more than 50% of the total insured, they only use 
slightly over 20% of the puskesmas health services (see Tabel 6). Assuming that the health 
of people of different income groups is the same they will have a similar pattern of need. 
This need does not however, seem to be satisfied by the puskesmas health care services. For 
hospital services this discrepancy is even larger. Only 12.37% of JPKM members using 
hospital care were Gakin. This indicates that there are other barriers than financing of the 
health care services that limit access to health care services by Gakin. 
 
Table 6: Utilization by Gakin as a Percentage of Total JPKM Utilization 
Type of Services  Gakin Visits per 
Month 
Total Visits per 
Month 
% of Visits by 
Gakin 
Outpatient Service  6,404  30,614  20.92% 
(Puskesmas and RSUD Outpatient)     
In-patient Service (RSUD)  12  97  12.37% 
Maternity 60  278  21.58% 
Emergency 98  538  18.22% 
Referral to RSUD  278  1,909  14.56% 
 
One possible barrier, identified by the Head of Puskesmas Kutasari, is the cost of 
transportation for poor citizens (Gakin) from their homes to the puskesmas. Even when they 
receive free treatment at the puskesmas, they often have to use public transportation or a 
relatively expensive motorbike taxi (ojek). The transportation cost is often much higher 
than the puskesmas’ user fee.
14 There is also the opportunity cost in attending the puskesmas 
that puts additional pressure on someone’s budget. This problem was raised by the 
puskesmas head we interviewed in Cilegon. 
 
Another problem contributing to the low utilization rate of puskesmas by Gakin/Strata I 
members is a community perception that the quality of health services in puskesmas is poor 
or people’s unwillingness to use conventional health treatment for their health care. Some 
                                                             
14 The transportation cost is estimated to be Rp10,000 per trip taken using ojek, while currently, the 
puskesmas user fee is set at Rp5,500/person/visit, and the fee is waived for JPKM members.   
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members/clients we interviewed stated that they prefer to use private providers, such as the 
one provided by paramedics (mantri), traditional healers, etc. 
 
These providers are often puskesmas staff who happen to live in the community where the 
clients live. They have often consulted these providers for their health care needs for many 
years, even decades. Thus, they feel a more personal relationship with these providers 
compared with other providers at a puskesmas. This is why they continue to use the service 
of these providers even when they charge much higher fees (sometimes the cost is up to 20 
times more) compared with the puskesmas fees. Finally, some puskesmas staff said that some 
patients (especially Gakin) are not willing to go to puskesmas/RSUD until their illness has 
become more serious. They attributed this to “cultural” issues (afraid of seeing formal 
health providers, etc).  
 
In addition, many Strata I members have not received their JPKM membership card. The 
card they have is still the old health social safety net (JPS-BK) card. Many Gakin members 
without the new card were reluctant to seek treatment at puskesmas, fearing that they 
would be refused treatment if they do not have the new card. In comparison, most Strata II 
and III members have already received their JPKM card. Thus, there is an indication that 
Bapel and the puskesmas prioritize the distribution of the card for premium-paying members 
instead of those who are Gakin. This might discourage Gakin members from using the 
health services available at puskesmas and RSUD. Thus, delaying the distribution of 
membership cards to Gakin serves as an informal rationing mechanism for reducing Gakin’s 
utilization of health services. 
There is also a large difference in referral of gakin and non-gakin members; fewer than 15% 
of the total referrals are for gakin patients. We have to observe this outcome from different 
perspectives to understand what has caused this outcome. From the patients’ perspective, it 
seems that not everybody is willing to go to hospital due to the long distance, length of 
time and costs that it would take to get there. From the hospital’s perspective:  there have 
been complaints from the hospital that the puskesmas initially referred too many cases that 
could actually be treated by puskesmas. 
 
The policy that referrals should be signed by puskesmas’ doctors was made because the 
RSUD complains that earlier, puskesmas referred too many patients to RSUD, often for 
cases which could have been treated by puskesmas. This resulted in the RSUD having to 
cope with a high number of new patients that also incurred higher health care 
expenditures. According to RSUD, most of these improper referrals were given by 
paramedics (mantri), so the diagnosis behind the referrals was also unclear. RSUD’s 
complaints have resulted in a lower level of referrals from puskesmas since 2004.
15 
 
Thus, the reasons why Gakin/Strata I utilizations were lower than other JPKM members 
could be attributed to the formal and informal rationing mechanism mentioned above. 
Since most of the health service users at puskesmas and RSUD were Strata II and III 
members, but most of the funding for JPKM (from BBM subsidies and DAU grants) were 
supposed to subsidize the health coverage for Gakin members, this means that a large 
portion of these funds were actually used for subsidizing the health services for better-off 
                                                             
15 We noted that in one case (Puskesmas Kutasari), before 2004, referrals by puskesmas were approximately 20-
30 cases per month, whereas in 2004, referrals decreased to 5-10 cases.   
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JPKM members. This might not be the most efficient way to provide health coverage for 
Purbalingga citizens, since most of its intended target never utilize the service and those 
that actually use it might actually be able to fund most if not all of their own health 
expenditures. 
 
F. MONITORING AND COORDINATION OF STAKEHOLDERS 
 
The JPKM Advisory Board consists of government officials from different district 
government’s departments/agencies and also from different sub-departments within the 
DinKes. There are 16 different agencies that are members of this Board, one of whom is 
DinKes. The Board has three functions: 
1.  Monitoring and guidance: visiting Bapel (although there are no permanent and routine 
scheduled visits), receiving complaints from the community/JPKM members; 
2.  Development: especially developing regulations for the JPKM scheme; and 
3.  Advisory: directed towards the three JPKM stakeholders: Bapel, health providers, and 
members (through kaders). 
 
In financial matters, monitoring is supposed to be done by the District Auditing Board 
(Badan Pengawas Daerah-Bawasda). The monitoring by Bapel of the quality of health 
services of the puskesmas and RSUD is done by the reporting of puskesmas and RSUD’s 
financial and expenditure data to Bapel.  
 
Formally, DinKes as part of the Advisory Board of JPKM, is responsible for monitoring the 
work of the Bapel, the effect of JPK-Gakin on utilization and quality (based on the DepKes 
book). Monitoring of the Bapel is performed by measuring the utilization of health care 
services and the health expenditure costs. Health care providers (puskesmas, pustu, and 
hospital) all provide monthly reports on utilization rates and expenditures to the DinKes. 
However, this kind of monitoring is rather limited and does not provide information 
concerning why people do or do not make use of health care services if they need it. Also, 
quality assessments of health care services are not done.  
 
There also appears to be little coordination between involved parties (DinKes, Bapel, and 
providers) in monitoring the use and the finances of JPKM. Specifically, it is unclear 
whether the financial and utilization reports submitted by health providers were checked 
and verified by other government agencies (DinKes and Bapel). Within these two agencies, 
there is no agreement on which one should verify these reports—Bapel said the DinKes 
should do it, while DinKes said Bapel should do so. 
 
Strata II and III members are more likely to complain about services they received at 
puskesmas/RSUD. On the other hand, there are very few complaints being lodged by 
Gakin/Strata I members. Bapel and health service providers attributed this to the lack of 
education of Gakin compared with the other two strata as well as a tendency to “just accept 
fate” (nrimo/pasrah) that made them unwilling to complain to healthcare providers/Bapel 
about the services they received.  
 
It is also likely that the fact Strata II and III members are paying for their JPKM 
membership, while Gakin/Strata I members do not pay anything, also contributes to more 
complaints being filed by the former groups than the latter. Strata II and III members 
demand better services from the healthcare providers because they have paid the JPKM  
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premium (so they feel “entitled” to receive services commensurate with the amount of 
premiums they have paid), while Gakin members do not care much about the quality of 
services of JPKM providers since they do not pay the premium. 
 
Measuring the level of satisfaction with health care services, especially when they are 
provided for free, is very difficult. When services are provided for free there is less 
likelihood that the clients will complain about those services. In addition, the assessment 
capabilities of a society with a low knowledge of health and health care is not a good 
benchmark. One option to filter complaints is at the community level through the kader, 
but such a system does not seem to have developed here.  
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III.  THE IMPACT OF JPKM ON HEALTH CARE 





Although health insurance takes away the risk of having to pay for health care and thus 
increases the affordability of health care, there are several characteristics of this health 
insurance scheme that may limit access to health services by the poor. We cannot compare 
the utilization rate before the implementation of JPKM with the rate after implementation, 
but from a comparison of utilization rates with puskesmas services in other regions it is 
obvious that the utilization rate is much higher in Purbalingga than in other regions 
evaluated. Attention also needs to be paid to the following:  
 
1)  The distribution of the JPKM card to members of different strata takes longer for Strata 
I members than for the paying members. This seems to be a general problem that also 
occurred in previous years. Gakin/Strata I members interviewed for this study are still 
using their old JPKM card because their new card has not been distributed. On the 
other hand the cards for Strata II and III members have been distributed. The lack of a 
new card could serve as a barrier for members (especially Gakin) that would make them 
reluctant to seek treatment at the health facilities.
16 
 
2)  The transportation cost, especially if it is costly, which discourages the poor from going 
to the puskesmas and/or RSUD, even if they are JPK-Gakin members, since they could 
not afford the transport cost. 
 
3)  Perception/stereotype of puskesmas: there is a common perception among community 
members that health services in puskesmas are of low quality (e.g. services offered by 
doctors/paramedics, quality of medicine, supplementary services such as laboratory, 
etc.). As long as this perception exists, many people would be reluctant to seek their 
treatments at puskesmas, and prefer to seek treatments with private providers, even 
when they charge much more than puskesmas. 
 
Private providers are not included in (or refused) to join the JPKM scheme. This reduces 
the access and choice of JPKM members in their health care, since they could only use 
their entitlement at public facilities (puskesmas and RSUD). This might contribute to the 
perception of some JPKM members that the health services offered by the public providers 
are inadequate or lacking in quality. Inclusion of private providers should be (encouraged 
by offering an appropriate level of compensation/reimbursement to them. This would 
increase access to, and choice of, health services for JPKM members. Inclusion could also 





                                                             
16 This is despite the reassurance from Bapel and puskesmas officials that Gakin members could still come to 
health facilities and receive treatment there, even when they do not have the newest membership card.   
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It is difficult to determine whether healthcare providers are operating efficiently, since 
even with JPKM/JPK-Gakin, most of their expenditures are reimbursed by the Bapel. Thus, 
JPKM is in practice not an insurance scheme, but just a health financing mechanism, in 
which the government fully subsidizes the health spending of the poor, and also partially 
subsidizes regular, paid JPKM members. 
 
RSUD officials believe that the quality of health services at the RSUD has improved since 
the enactment of the JPKM scheme, because RSUD management has increased “incentive 
payments” for its staff. In addition, the RSUD has purchased new hospital beds (although 
we observed that many of the new beds are in the Class I and VIP category, which is 
assumed to be for patients who can afford to pay the entire cost of their health care 




This health insurance scheme is not sustainable as it is highly dependent on large sums of 
subsidies. First of all, the premium for the poor is fully paid by BBM subsidies and in 
addition DAU is used for partial contributions to all three strata. Secondly, the health care 
services are also subsidized through other funds, such as regular appropriations by the local 
government to subsidize the operational expenses of puskesmas.  Puskesmas also receive 
government subsidies to purchase medicines and medical equipment. We have been unable 
to determine however, whether the capitation payments set for the different health care 
providers have had an effect on containing costs. 
 
During the first and second year, the expenditures of the RSUD exceeded the budget (i.e. 
incurred a deficit). This deficit has since decreased, due to increasing capitation funding for 
the RSUD. Whether or not there will be a deficit is still in question and the RSUD is not 
answering it. RSUD officials also do not think that the deficit could turn into a serious 
financing problem in the future. Their attitude seems to be that as long as the district 
government continues to channel money to them, there won’t be any problems. Thus, 
there is no incentive for puskesmas to try to control costs and reduce expenditures in order 
to avoid deficit spending.  
 
This, combined with lack of monitoring of RSUD financing by Bapel (see above), casts 
some doubt over the long-term sustainability of the JPKM program, since financial 
sustainability requires a good financial plan that is enforceable and also accountability 
measures to prevent abuse/misuse of program funds. There seems to be little financial 
planning and control done by both Bapel and providers to maintain the efficiency of the 
scheme and to eliminate unnecessary expenditures. There are also no clear measures to 
ensure financial accountability of health providers in using the funds received from the 
Bapel. Without these, the scheme will be vulnerable to possible abuse and fraud, which 
could endanger its long-term sustainability. 
 
The planned increase in JPKM insurance premiums to reflect its real market value in the 
next few years (to about Rp96,000/person/year) could potentially reduce the number of 
members participating in the scheme. This could also endanger the program’s 
sustainability, especially if the number of members dropping out of the scheme is 
significant.   
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
The JPKM scheme in Purbalingga has been more successful in providing access to adequate 
health care coverage to members of the population, especially the poor. The number of 
people enrolled as JPKM members is quite substantial in comparison to similar schemes in 
other districts, thanks largely to extensive marketing and socialization efforts undertaken 
by  kaders. The largely successful use of kaders in socializing the JPKM scheme in 
Purbalingga is of special attention and may provide the model for similar schemes in other 
Indonesian districts/regions. 
 
The Purbalingga scheme needs to be improved in several ways however, in order to 
enhance its effectiveness and increase the number of people willing to join it. In addition, 
there are a few problems that need to be addressed by the Bapel and the health providers 
that could hinder the effectiveness of JPKM in delivering its service to its members, such as 
the following: 
 
•  There appears to be significant pressure to enroll more paying JPKM members into the 
scheme, for instance, by increasing the puskesmas’ user fees and by upgrading many 
Gakin/Strata I members into Strata II/post Gakin status. These steps might be 
premature, considering the fact that there might be some Gakin families that in reality 
are still Gakin, but are forced to move up to Strata II status as a result of these pressures. 
This might force them to drop their JPKM membership altogether, since they are not 
able to afford the premium. The pressure to include more paying members into the 
JPKM scheme should be balanced by a concern to provide fair treatment to its members 
based on their ability to pay.  
 
•  There appear to be formal and informal barriers made to discourage some Gakin 
members from using the services they are entitled to, such as: the high transportation 
cost, the delay in the distribution of their membership card, etc. Such barriers might 
negate the function of JPKM as a health assistance scheme for the poor and could result 
in the misallocation of Gakin subsidies to the supposedly better-off members at Strata II 
and III level, who can theoretically afford to pay some of their own health care costs. 
 
•  There seems to be a lack of efficiency in the use of JPKM funds by health providers 
(especially RSUD). As long as the payment system is operating de facto as a FFS,
17 cost 
control would not be achieved and the use of more expensive health 
services/treatments that might not be necessary for patients would be encouraged.  
 
•  There is little monitoring done by the Bapel and DinKes on the use of JPKM funds by 
health providers. It is not known whether all the reimbursement claims made by the 
providers are claims for services actually provided. This could provide the opportunity 
to misuse the funds through the submission of fraudulent claims. 
                                                             
17 This is especially true for Gakin patients. Some cost limitations were imposed to premium paying Strata II 
and III members.   
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•  There is little involvement of non-government stakeholders (especially JPKM 
members) in the design, implementation and monitoring of the scheme. JPKM 
members are just passive clients who pay the premium, receive the membership card, 
and receive health services from JPKM providers. They do not participate in the 
decision-making of the scheme itself. This makes the management of the program less 
transparent and accountable to its stakeholders, especially its members.  
 
•  There is no involvement of private health providers in the provision of health services 
for JPKM members. They are only able to seek health services in publicly managed 
health facilities (puskesmas and RSUD). Part of the reason for private providers not 
participating in JPKM is its low reimbursement rate for health services performed, 
which is set at a rate much lower than the market price. In any case, the fact that 
private providers do not participate in the scheme results in a more limited choice of 
health providers available for its members, which could deny them access to better 
quality services.  
 
To address these problems and to make the JPKM scheme in Purbalingga work better, the 
following steps are recommended to be implemented by the Purbalingga government: 
 
•  Improve the quality of services provided by puskesmas. Many citizens perceive puskesmas 
to have a low service quality, and thus, they are not willing to seek health care 
treatment there. If puskesmas services are improved, it is hoped that its image among 
community members would be improved as well, and thus, more citizens and JPKM 
members would seek their health treatment there.  
 
•  Reduce or eliminate the formal and informal barriers for Gakin families to use the 
services to which they are entitled. This could be achieved by speeding up the 
distribution of Gakin membership cards and by providing some transportation subsidies 
for Gakin patients. The government also needs to eliminate the misallocation of Gakin 
subsidies to higher income/Strata groups, to ensure that the JPKM scheme truly meets 
its intended purpose to provide health financing for poor families. 
 
•  Improve the efficiency of health services delivery by health providers (puskesmas and 
RSUD). Health services given to JPKM members should be appropriate to their needs 
and should be medically necessary. The use of more expensive but not medically 
necessary services/treatments should be discouraged by the imposition of efficiency-
controlling mechanisms.  
 
•  Provide more strict monitoring (both internal and external) to ensure that the JPKM 
funds allocated to provide health services at RSUD and puskesmas are spent effectively 
and efficiently. The monitoring should be done both by Bapel (or Bawasda) and also by 
an independent monitoring unit that could be set up by the community or by a JPKM 
members’ association. 
 
•  Implement measures to increase JPKM members’ participation in the planning, 
implementation and monitoring of the JPKM scheme. The members should be allowed 
a voice in the decision-making process affecting their welfare and their membership in 
the JPKM scheme. The creation of a JPKM members’ association would be the first step 
to achieving this goal.   
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•  Incentives should be created to make the kaders more productive in recruiting new 
members. This could include regular honorariums for kaders that would be higher than 
the current incentive payments available to them (Rp1,000 per new member signed up).  
 
•  Consider including private providers (e.g. private doctors, private hospitals and health 
clinics) in the list of providers of the JPKM scheme. This would increase the choice of 
providers for members of the scheme and would improve their access to needed health 
services. In order to attract private providers into the scheme, higher capitation 
payments might be necessary so that the payment would be in line with the market rate 
charged by private providers. This might however, require a premium increase, that 
might force some JPKM members to drop out of the scheme because they could no 
longer afford the premium. Thus, the costs and benefits of expanding the choice of 
providers needs to be carefully weighed.  
 
•  Consider charging a minimum premium rate or co-insurance for Gakin/Strata I 
members, since it seems that paying JPKM members are more likely to demand better 
services from the providers than non-paying ones and are more likely to complain when 
these services are not delivered to their satisfaction. This would motivate Gakin 
members to demand better services from providers as well. Of course, the charges 
imposed on Gakin members should be set at an appropriate minimal level so that they 
would not drop out from the JPKM scheme altogether due to affordability issues.   
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APPENDIX 1: RIGHTS OF JPKM MEMBERS 
 
 
1.  Receive outpatient and in-patient services in puskesmas, such as: 
 
Outpatient Services 
- Village polyclinic. 
- Sub health center (pustu). 
- Puskesmas (I. General check-up, II. Emergency treatment such as: a. Dental treatment, III. 
Minor surgery as stipulated by the local government (Perda) legislation, IV. Maternity: for 
Strata I clients all costs are covered if members attend a public hospital/clinic, such as a 
puskesmas, pustu, polindes, Panti Nugroho maternity clinic and RSUD. For Strata II there is a 
maximum limit of Rp80,000 and for Strata III there is a limit of Rp90,000, V. Laboratory 
check-up with a maximum limit of Rp10,000.  
 
In-patient Services (puskesmas) 
a.  Receives reimbursement for up to Rp125,000 for Strata II members and Rp150,000 for 
Strata III members, with a maximum stay of three days.  
 
2.  Receive outpatient and in-patient services in RSUD, such as: 
 
a.  Outpatient consultations both with general and specialist doctors at RSUD clinic. 
b.  Medications (JPKM standard). 
c.  Supplemental outpatient services, such as: laboratory (reimbursed for up to Rp15,000), X-ray 
(reimbursed for up to Rp25,000), USG (reimbursed for up to Rp30,000), EKG (fully reimbursed 
by JPKM). 
d.  Minor emergency measures. 
e.  Physical therapy.  
f.  Nutrition consultation. 
g.  In-patient service at Class III ward, if JPKM members want to get treatment at higher-class 
ward, they can do so, but they have to pay the difference between fees for higher-class ward and 
Class III ward (co-insurance). 
h.  For emergency surgery/operation, expenses are reimbursed to a maximum Rp500,000. 
 
3.  Services Not Covered By JPKM 
 
1.  Kidney dialysis. 
2.  Eye glasses and contact lenses. 
3.  Major dental treatment (e.g. prosthesis and orthodontal).  
4.  Patients with HIV/AIDS, permanent disability, mental illnesses. 
5.  Ambulatory care, funeral service and autopsy (except for Gakin/Strata I, who are fully covered). 
6.  Wheelchair, walking stick, corset, and other supporting aid. 
7.  Blood transfusion. 
8.  Infertility/impotency treatment and medication. 
9.  Cosmetic treatment/surgery. 
10. General check-up. 
11. Medical treatment outside the Purbalingga District (Note: Gakin could be referred outside the 
district (RSUP and RSCM Jakarta).   
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APPENDIX 2: THE CRITERIA TO BE CONSIDERED A POOR 
FAMILY (GAKIN) IN THE PURBALINGGA DISTRICT 
 
 
In order to be considered as a poor family in Purbalingga, a family has to meet two or more of the 
indicators set up by the Bupati of Purbalingga Decree No. 29/2003, effective July 31, 2003: 
 
1.  The family’s earnings are not sufficient to pay for food consumption of the family in the amount 
of 2,100 calorie per day (or Rp85,000/person/month). 
2.  The family is not able to eat more than twice per day.  
3.  Member(s) of the family is/are suffering from malnutrition. 
4.  The family does not have an appropriate housing (e.g. house has a dirt floor). 
5.  The family cannot afford health care and family planning services.  
6.  The family is unable to send their children (between the age of  7 to 15 years) to school. 
7.  The family does not have more than three pieces of good clothing. 
 